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This article examines legal responses to the pervasive legacy of ‘environmental warfare’ during 
the Vietnam War, most notably the use of Agent Orange and other chemical herbicides. It 
engages in a historical analysis of the different efforts to establish American accountability 
under international law, including within the United Nations General Assembly and before 
American courts, until the more recent United States-funded environmental remediation projects 
in dioxin contaminated areas and assistance to persons with disabilities. In doing so, the article 
draws attention to the unaccomplished quest for justice of the Vietnamese people and to some 
problematic dimensions of legal debates surrounding the environmental and human 
consequences of the Vietnam conflict. Borrowing insights from the postcolonial critique of 
international law, it suggests that the ‘dynamics of exclusion’ embedded in the laws of armed 
conflict may help to explain not only the way in which the war was fought in Vietnam, but also 
the reaction of the US and legal institutions to its deleterious impacts on humans and ecosystems. 
Revisiting past and current initiatives to address the effects of ‘environmental warfare’ in 
Vietnam raises hard questions on the role of international law and remedies vis-a-vis 
environmental degradation associated with contemporary conflicts in the Global South. It invites 
also to reflect on unintended consequences of proposals for law reforms that seek to reinforce 
environmental protection in war-torn countries, while reproducing injustices and discrimination. 
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I INTRODUCTION 
Pham Thi Phuong Khanh, 21, is another such patient. She quietly pulls a towel 
over her face as a visitor to the Peace Village ward in Tu Du Hospital in Ho Chi 
Minh City, starts to take a picture of her enlarged, hydrocephalic head. … Perhaps 
Ms Khanh does not want strangers to stare at her. Perhaps she feels ashamed. But 
if she does feel shame, why is it that those who should do not?1 
 
Recent decades have witnessed a growing interest among scholars, 
international institutions and civil society in the adverse environmental impact of 
armed conflict.2 This focus on environmental protection in the context of warfare 
can be explained in light of a broader concern of states and peoples about the 
ecological challenges of our interconnected world, including severe pollution, 
natural resource scarcity and climate change. From earlier legal debates centred 
on the direct impact of means and methods of warfare upon the environment, a 
wider approach is slowly emerging which examines the multiple correlations 
between environmental issues and violent conflict.3 Yet at a closer look, a story 
is absent within the larger narrative on the topic: the Vietnam War. This is 
particularly surprising given the massive use of chemical herbicides (eg Agent 
Orange) and other environmentally harmful tactics during the war, and the 
enduring legacy of that conflict. Dioxin contamination caused by deployment of 
Agent Orange has been (and is still) affecting the lives and health of millions of 
Vietnamese people. Extant discussions recognise that the Vietnam War is the 
‘event’ that led to the adoption of specific provisions in the laws of armed 
conflict proscribing ‘widespread, long-term, and severe environmental damage’.4 
In other words, in the literature, the Vietnam conflict is relegated to the past, to a 
time where international law was still underdeveloped and international 
institutions had their hands tied due to the Cold War confrontation. As a result, 
                                                 
 1 Viet Thanh Nguyen and Richard Hughes, ‘The Forgotten Victims of Agent Orange’, The 
New York Times (online), 15 September 2017 
<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/15/opinion/agent-orange-vietnam-effects.html> 
archived at <https://perma.cc/4F33-JJNV>.  
 2 See, eg, Elizabeth Maruma Mrema, Carl Bruch and Jordan Diamond, Protecting the 
Environment during Armed Conflict: An Inventory and Analysis of International Law 
(United Nations Environment Programme, 2009); Richard Matthew and David Jensen, 
From Conflict to Peacebuilding: The Role of Natural Resources and the Environment 
(United Nations Environment Programme, 2009). The topic ‘protection of the environment 
in relation to armed conflict’ has been included in the work of the International Law 
Commission in 2011. See International Law Commission, Report of the International Law 
Commission on the Work of its Sixty-Third Session (26 April – 3 June and 4 July – 12 
August 2011), UN GAOR, 66th sess, Supp No 10, UN Doc A/66/10 (2011) annex E.  
 3 See, eg, Onita Das, Environmental Protection, Security and Armed Conflict: A Sustainable 
Development Perspective (Edward Elgar, 2013); Rosemary Rayfuse (ed), War and the 
Environment: New Approaches to Protecting the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflict 
(Brill, 2014) vol 45; Daniëlla Dam-de Jong, International Law and Governance of Natural 
Resources in Conflict and Post-Conflict Situations (Cambridge University Press, 2015); 
Carsten Stahn, Jens Iverson and Jennifer S Easterday (eds), Environmental Protection and 
Transitions from Conflict to Peace (Oxford University Press, 2017).  
 4 See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), opened for signature 8 
June 1977, 1125 UNTS 3 (entered into force 7 December 1978) arts 35(3), 55 (‘Additional 
Protocol I’).  
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present-day scholarship often discusses it as part of the historical context or in a 
footnote.5 
This article moves the Vietnam War from the peripheries to the core of 
international debates and practices and, by doing so, aims to show its importance 
to a deeper understanding of how international law regulates conflict-related 
environmental issues. Through a historical analysis of the different efforts to 
establish American responsibility for the use of chemical herbicides, until the 
more recent implementation of environmental remediation projects in dioxin 
contaminated areas and assistance to persons with disabilities, this article revisits 
the long quest for justice of Vietnamese victims and thereby illuminates the 
limitations of legal avenues for redress. In 2006, based on a renewed economic 
and political cooperation between the American and Vietnamese governments, a 
Joint Advisory Committee was established and the United States started to fund 
environmental remediation projects in areas characterised as ‘hot spots’ for the 
high dioxin contamination. Given the controversies surrounding the use of Agent 
Orange during the conflict, the recent practice of the US raises the question of 
the legal nature of these initiatives under international law. Although the US has 
consistently denied any liability and qualified the funding of environmental 
restoration and health programmes in Vietnam as a form of development aid, a 
closer look at the features of these programmes may lead to a different 
conclusion. Ongoing initiatives to address dioxin contamination and human 
suffering in Vietnam also pose broader concerns. Borrowing insights from the 
postcolonial critique of international law,6 this article suggests that the dynamics 
of exclusion embedded in the laws of armed conflict may help to explain not 
only the massive use of herbicides in Vietnam, but also the reaction of the US 
and the international institutions to its deleterious impact on humans and 
ecosystems, including the recent turn to ‘voluntary remediation’.7 
Revisiting past and present responses to ‘environmental warfare’ in Vietnam 
raises novel questions on the relevance of international law vis-a-vis the hidden 
                                                 
 5 An exception is the work of Richard Falk. See, eg, Richard A Falk, ‘Environmental Warfare 
and Ecocide — Facts, Appraisal, and Proposals’ (1973) 4 Bulletin of Peace Proposals 80; 
Richard Falk, ‘The Inadequacy of the Existing Legal Approach to Environmental Protection 
in Wartime’ in Jay E Austin and Carl E Bruch (eds), The Environmental Consequences of 
War: Legal, Economic and Scientific Perspectives (Cambridge University Press, 2000) 137.  
 6 I am profoundly indebted to the teaching of Professor Antony Anghie for everything I know 
about the postcolonial critique of international law and Third World Approaches to 
International Law (‘TWAIL’) scholarship. Among his vast contribution, see, eg, Antony 
Anghie, ‘Finding the Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonialism in Nineteenth-Century 
International Law’ (1999) 40 Harvard International Law Journal 1; Antony Anghie, ‘The 
Heart of My Home: Colonialism, Environmental Damage, and the Nauru Case’ (1993) 34 
Harvard International Law Journal 445; Antony Anghie and B S Chimni, ‘Third World 
Approaches to International Law and Individual Responsibility in Internal Conflicts’ (2003) 
2 Chinese Journal of International Law 77; Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and 
the Making of International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2004); Antony Anghie, 
‘Imperialism and International Legal Theory’ in Anne Orford and Florian Hoffmann with 
Martin Clark (eds), The Oxford Handbook of The Theory of International Law (Oxford 
University Press, 2016) 156.  
 7 For this part of the analysis, I borrow from the scholarship of Frédéric Mégret. See 
especially Frédéric Mégret, ‘Theorizing the Laws of War’ in Anne Orford and Florian 
Hoffmann with Martin Clark (eds), The Oxford Handbook of The Theory of International 
Law (Oxford University Press, 2016) 762; Frédéric Mégret, ‘From “Savages” to “Unlawful 
Combatants”: A Postcolonial Look at International Humanitarian Law’s “Other”’, in Anne 
Orford (ed), International Law and its Others (Cambridge University Press, 2006) 265.  
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ecological and human costs of contemporary armed conflict. This analysis will 
especially resonate with ongoing discussions on more pragmatic approaches to 
environmental degradation and pollution associated with modern warfare. 
Acknowledging the difficulties in implementing ex post facto responsibility for 
conflict-related environmental harms, some scholars claim that, in the 
environmental field, priority should be given to remedial measures adopted 
voluntarily by the wrongdoer or through multilateral cooperation.8 It cannot be 
denied that international law faces challenges in addressing environmental 
damage. From the vagueness of primary rules, to the need to establish attribution 
and causation, to evidence collection and assessment,9 it may be apposite to start 
a reflection on alternative ways to confront environmental harm and the threats it 
poses to human health and survival. Nonetheless, a voluntary approach to post-
conflict environmental remediation, like the one implemented in Vietnam and 
discussed in this article, is also problematic. By exposing the dark sides of the 
idea of ‘voluntary remediation’, this article hopes to pave the way for more just 
and contextualised approaches to the ecological consequences of war. 
The remainder of the article proceeds as follows. Part II provides a brief 
overview of ‘environmental warfare’ in Vietnam and its persistent legacy. Part 
III explores the different efforts to establish accountability for the environmental 
and human costs of the US military strategy, namely: first, the mobilisation of 
the academic community against ecocide; second, the United Nations General 
Assembly’s (‘UNGA’) resolutions and the International War Crimes Tribunal for 
the Vietnam War (‘Russell Tribunal’); third, domestic litigation before American 
courts under the Alien Tort Claims Act (‘ATCA’).10 One of the purposes of this 
                                                 
 8 See, eg, Cymie R Payne, ‘The Norm of Environmental Integrity in Post-Conflict Legal 
Regimes’ in Carsten Stahn, Jennifer S Easterday and Jens Iverson (eds), Jus Post Bellum: 
Mapping the Normative Foundations (Oxford University Press, 2014) 502, 505, suggesting 
that there are two approaches to the topic: one asks ‘what is moral?’, while the other focuses 
on ‘what works?’. In her view, ‘[d]eterrence, revenge, and accountability … are not the 
primary aim’ in relation to the environment. The conclusion is that ‘jus post bellum theories 
that prioritize peacebuilding over retribution accord best with environmental integrity, in 
terms of explanatory power and consonance with goals’. The importance of post-conflict 
remediation is also emphasised by the International Law Commission Special Rapporteur on 
the Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflict. Among the draft 
principles applicable to the post-conflict phase, draft principle 15 ‘Post-armed conflict 
environmental assessments and remedial measures’, encourages the establishment of forms 
of cooperation ‘among relevant actors’, including international organizations, in the area of 
post-conflict environmental assessment and remedial measures. The principle refers to 
forms of cooperation and leaves unaddressed the issue of who (if anyone) should bear the 
responsibility for damage. See Marie G Jacobsson, Special Rapporteur, Third Report on the 
Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed Conflicts, 68th sess, UN Doc 
A/CN.4/700 (3 June 2016) annex I (‘Protection of the Environment in Relation to Armed 
Conflicts: Proposed Draft Principles’).  
 9 For some references on this debate, see, eg, Alexandre Kiss, ‘Present Limits to the 
Enforcement of State Responsibility for Environmental Damage’ in Francesco Francioni 
and Tullio Scovazzi (eds), International Responsibility for Environmental Harm (Kluwer 
Law International, 1991) 3; Tullio Scovazzi, ‘Some Remarks on International Responsibility 
in the Field of Environmental Protection’, in Maurizio Ragazzi (ed), International 
Responsibility Today: Essays in Memory of Oscar Schachter (Koninklijke Brill, 2005) 209; 
Catherine Redgwell, ‘The Wrong Trousers: State Responsibility and International 
Environmental Law’ in Malcolm Evans and Panos Koutrakos (eds), The International 
Responsibility of the European Union: European and International Perspectives (Hart, 
2013) 257.  
 10 Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 USC § 1350 (1789) (‘ATCA’). 
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historical excursus is to outline how legal arguments, which draw upon the laws 
of war, were used both to affirm and to deny the responsibility of the US for 
‘environmental warfare’ and related harms. Part IV considers the more recent 
cooperation between the American and Vietnamese governments in the area of 
dioxin contamination removal and reflects on the legal nature, under 
international law, of ongoing environmental and health projects funded by the 
US government. This discussion lays the foundation for the introduction of the 
concept of ‘voluntary remediation’. Part V draws upon the postcolonial critique 
of the laws of armed conflict (and international law more generally) to argue that 
the use of herbicides during the Vietnam War and its legal justifications posit a 
vision of the enemy and her environment as ‘savage’, while the turn to 
‘voluntary remediation’ for environmental war damage may reproduce a similar 
postcolonial mindset. Part VI concludes. 
II ‘ENVIRONMENTAL WARFARE’ IN VIETNAM AND ITS LEGACY 
The Vietnam War of 1961–75 is notorious for the disastrous environmental 
and human impact of the US counterinsurgency warfare.11 Having to confront 
guerrilla tactics by its enemy, with which it was not particularly familiar, and 
relying on a relatively small ground force, the US Army compensated this deficit 
by employing technologically advanced weaponry to manipulate the 
environment for hostile purposes.12 In other words, it engaged in what has been 
called ‘environmental warfare’.13 According to commentators, three military 
tactics were responsible for extensive environmental damage: the use of 
chemical herbicides, ‘Rome Plows’ and high-explosive bombs.14 Their declared 
military rationale was essentially twofold: first, removing the vegetation cover to 
facilitate the enemy’s targeting and limit the enemy’s freedom of movement and 
second, destroying crops and thereby denying the enemy food supply and 
support from the civilian population.15 
There can be scarcely any doubt as to the severity and long-term nature of the 
damage caused to the Vietnamese environment. High-explosive munitions (14 
million tonnes, according to an estimate) destroyed the flora and fauna and left 
moonscape-like craters in the Vietnamese landscape, with a consequent increase 
of soil erosion.16 ‘Rome Plows’, which are heavy caterpillar bulldozers (33 000 
                                                 
 11 Richard Falk argues that the deliberate targeting of the environment was based on the 
consideration that the only way to defeat the enemy ‘was to deny him the cover, the food 
and the life-support of the countryside’ and that ‘just as counter-insurgency warfare tends 
toward genocide with respect to the people, so it tends toward ecocide with respect to the 
environment’. See Falk, ‘Environmental Warfare’, above n 5, 80. I will return to this point 
in Part V.  
 12 Arthur H Westing, Arthur H Westing: Pioneer on the Environmental Impact of War 
(Springer, 2013) 40.  
 13 The term is defined by Falk as denoting ‘all those weapons and tactics which either intend to 
destroy the environment per se or disrupt normal relationship between man and nature on 
sustained basis’. See Falk, ‘Environmental Warfare’, above n 5, 85. See also Arthur 
Westing, ‘Environmental Warfare’ (1985) 15 Environmental Law 645, 646: conceptualising 
environmental warfare as ‘warfare in which the environment is manipulated for hostile 
military purposes’.  
 14 Karen Hulme, War Torn Environment: Interpreting the Legal Threshold (Koninklijke Brill, 
2004) 5.  
 15 Westing, above n 12, 48. 
 16 Hulme, above n 14, 5. 
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kilograms) employed to remove trees and destroy cropland, cleared 325 000 
hectares of South Vietnamese forest and thousands of hectares of agricultural 
areas.17 Yet it was the massive use of herbicides that received the strongest 
condemnation for its devastating effects on ecosystems and human health.18 The 
most widely used herbicides were Agent Orange, Agent White and Agent Blue, 
the latter employed against crops and the formers against the forest vegetation.19 
The infamous Operation Ranch Hand started in January 1962 and ended in 
January 1971.20 During these nine years, herbicides were sprayed from cargo 
planes over forests, cropland, roads, villages in South Vietnam and along the 
demilitarised zone. Although the exact quantity remains unknown, it is estimated 
that around 20 million gallons of herbicides were sprayed over 5 million acres of 
forests and fields, an area representing more than 10 per cent of South 
Vietnam.21 Even after the end of Operation Ranch Hand, herbicides continued to 
be used around military bases and stored in local facilities.22 
Further to its ecological impact (eg in terms of soil and water pollution, loss 
of forests and biodiversity), it has been demonstrated that exposure to herbicides 
increases the risk of contracting serious diseases. Chemical defoliants contain a 
high dose of dioxin, which is associated with several cancers, birth defects, 
respiratory problems, liver damage and other grave illnesses.23 Considering that 
the alleged quantity of herbicides sprayed over Vietnam was 25 times the normal 
range of agricultural use in the US, and that dioxin can persist for 100 years or 
more once it penetrates the soil and aquifers,24 the impacts of ‘environmental 
warfare’ in Vietnam can only be described as dramatic. Millions of people, both 
civilians and soldiers, were exposed to high levels of herbicides without being 
aware of the health risks; hence, precautions were not adopted. Since the end of 
the war, millions more Vietnamese people have been exposed to dioxin remnants 
in the soil and the water.25 It remains difficult to determine the exact number of 
                                                 
 17 Westing, above n 12, 47.  
 18 For a history of the development and military use of herbicides, see R Scott Frey, ‘Agent 
Orange and America at War in Vietnam and Southeast Asia’ (2013) 20 Human Ecology 
Review 1, 2–3. Frey explains that, although scientists started to develop herbicides to 
increase agricultural productivity since the beginning of 20th century, it was during World 
War II that the major Western powers, notably the US and the UK, conducted studies on the 
military use of herbicides. Herbicides were not employed as weapons during World War II, 
but only for mosquito control in the Pacific theatre of warfare and lice control in Europe. In 
the post-World War II period the US Department of Defence developed the so-called 
‘Rainbow Herbicides’ that were used as weapons in South-East Asia. Dow Chemical and 
Monsanto were among the corporations involved in the production and supply of herbicides 
for Operation Ranch Hand.  
 19 Falk, ‘Environmental Warfare’, above n 5, 85.  
 20 More precisely, in 1971 herbicides were substituted with Rome Plows. See Hulme, above 
n 14, 5.  
 21 Frey, above n 18, 3. See also David Zierler, The Invention of Ecocide: Agent Orange, 
Vietnam, and the Scientists Who Changed the Way We Think about the Environment 
(University of Georgia Press, 2011) 85.  
 22 Frey, above n 18, 3.  
 23 Ibid.  
 24 Ibid.  
 25 Michael F Martin, ‘Vietnamese Victims of Agent Orange and US–Vietnam Relations’ 
(Report, Congressional Research Service, 29 August 2012) 15 
<https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34761.pdf> archived at <https://perma.cc/F8LQ-R8X7> 
(‘Vietnamese Victims’). 
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deaths and diseases that can be attributed to the use of Agent Orange and other 
toxic substances.26 Nonetheless, scientists have identified health conditions 
directly linked to herbicide exposure, such as leukemia, non-Hodgkinson 
lymphoma and sarcoma, recurrent among the Vietnamese population.27 The US 
Department of Veteran Affairs compiled a list of diseases and conditions 
associated with Agent Orange/dioxin exposure, which includes Hodgkin’s 
disease, prostate cancer, respiratory cancers and soft tissue sarcoma, as well as 
diseases and malformations in the children of exposed parents.28 Stories of 
young Vietnamese people still suffering from conditions supposedly related to 
dioxin contamination, which are reported in international media,29 show how 
Operation Ranch Hand continues to inflict ‘casualties’ more than 50 years after it 
was launched. 
III THE LONG QUEST FOR JUSTICE: EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH ACCOUNTABILITY 
FOR HUMAN AND ENVIRONMENTAL DEVASTATION 
A The Mobilisation of the Academic Community against ‘Ecocide’ 
‘Environmental warfare’ in Vietnam, and most notably the massive use of 
chemical herbicides, spawned condemnation across the civil society. The term 
‘ecocide’ started to be employed to describe the devastating environmental and 
human impact of American military tactics in Vietnam. The concept was first 
coined by a plant biologist and chair of the department of botany at Yale 
University, Arthur Galston, to characterise the ‘wilful and permanent destruction 
of the environment in which people can live in a manner of their own 
choosing’.30 At a conference on ‘War Crimes and the American Conscience’ 
held in 1970, Galston condemned Operation Ranch Hand and asked the 
international community, through the United Nations, to come together against 
ecocide like the world did after World War II against genocide and crimes 
against humanity.31 
Richard Falk developed this set of ideas and framed them in legal terms. In 
his 1973 publication, ‘Environmental Warfare, Facts, Appraisal and Proposals’, 
Falk proceeded in two steps: first, he explored whether the laws of war 
proscribed ‘environmental warfare’ (ie the use of herbicides, bulldozers and 
high-explosive bombs); second, he proposed legal reforms to address ecological 
devastation in Vietnam.32 Falk concluded that, by deploying herbicides, the US 
                                                 
 26 According to the Vietnam Association of Victims of Agent Orange/Dioxin, 2.1 million to 
4.8 million Vietnamese were exposed to herbicides during the war, and at least 3 million 
suffered diseases related to the exposure: ibid 22.  
 27 Frey, above n 18, 5.  
 28 Vietnamese Victims, above n 25, 22. The list of diseases is also available online at US 
Department of Veterans Affairs, Veterans’ Diseases Associated with Agent Orange (3 June 
2015) <https://www.publichealth.va.gov/exposures/agentorange/conditions/> archived at 
<https://perma.cc/8GYJ-J48W>.  
 29 See, eg, Nguyen and Hughes, above n 1. An entire section of the War Remnants Museum in 
Ho Chi Minh City displays pictures documenting the effects of Agent Orange and other 
defoliants on Vietnamese people across generations.  
 30 Zierler, above n 21, 19, 114.  
 31 Bronwyn Leebaw, ‘Scorched Earth: Environmental War Crimes and International Justice’ 
(2014) 12 Perspectives on Politics 770, 777.  
 32 Falk, ‘Environmental Warfare’, above n 5. 
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violated the 1925 Geneva Protocol on Gas, Chemical and Bacteriological 
Warfare (‘Geneva Protocol’).33 In relation to the targeting of cropland, Falk 
contended that the military use of herbicide was also in violation of the jus in 
bello principle of discrimination.34 As for the use of bulldozing tractors and 
bombs over extensive areas covered by forests, Falk observed that the legal 
standards in force did not prohibit these tactics, as pure environmental 
considerations were alien to the law’s purview.35 Falk’s analysis captures well 
the ambivalent character of jus in bello as it stood in the 1970s. On the one hand, 
it appeared to proscribe the use of chemical defoliants to destroy crops as 
contrary to the principle of discrimination; on the other, it ended up justifying 
different forms of environmental destruction and related human suffering if 
proportional and necessary to achieve the war’s objectives. 
To fill gaps in the legal landscape, Falk called for the development of new 
instruments, namely an International Convention on the Crime of Ecocide and a 
Draft Protocol on Environmental Warfare.36 He argued that such normative 
agenda had gained momentum and that 
[t]he Indochina context, given the public outrage over the desecration of the land 
at a time of rising environmental consciousness, creates a target of opportunity 
comparable to Nuremberg. Surely it is no exaggeration to consider the forests and 
plantations treated by Agent Orange as an Auschwitz for environmental values, 
certainly not from the perspective of such a distinct environmental species as the 
mangrove tree or nipa palm. And just as the Genocide Convention came along to 
formalize part of what has already been condemned and punished at Nuremberg, 
so an Ecocide Convention could help carry forward into the future a legal 
condemnation of environmental warfare in Indochina.37 
Falk’s Convention on the Crime of Ecocide defined ecocide as encompassing 
‘acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a human ecosystem’, 
both in peacetime or wartime.38 The Draft Protocol on Environmental Warfare 
proscribed conduct of the type described above (eg use of chemicals, bombs and 
bulldozing) and made violations of its provisions international crimes.39 
Despite the advocacy from the scientific and legal communities, a far less 
ambitious result was achieved. The Convention on the Prohibition of Military or 
Any Other Hostile Uses of Environmental Modification Techniques (‘ENMOD 
Convention’) was adopted in 1976, the scope of which was limited to military 
and hostile environmental modification techniques (ie the use of the environment 
                                                 
 33 Ibid 87; Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other 
Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, opened for signature 17 June 1925, 94 
LNTS 65 (entered into force 9 May 1926) (‘Geneva Protocol’). 
 34 Falk, ‘Environmental Warfare’, above n 5, 87. 
 35 Ibid 88.  
 36 Ibid 91. 
 37 Ibid 84.  
 38 Ibid 93 app 1.  
 39 Ibid 95 app 2.  
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as a ‘weapon’).40 Further, two provisions proscribing ‘widespread, long-term and 
severe’ environmental damage were included in the 1977 Protocol Additional to 
the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) (‘Additional Protocol I’), 
namely arts 35(3) and 55.41 Compared with the calls for the introduction of an 
international crime of ecocide, the protection outlined in the ENMOD 
Convention and Additional Protocol I was more modest and did not entail any 
criminal sanction.42 Only in 1998 was a specific provision criminalising 
environmental damage as a war crime included in the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court, which nonetheless has been criticised for its high 
threshold of damage and applicability only to international armed conflict.43 
B More than Words? UNGA Resolutions and the International War Crimes 
Tribunal for the Vietnam War 
The reaction of international institutions to ‘environmental warfare’ was 
tepid, although a few attempts were made to establish accountability for the US’s 
conduct of warfare. With the UN Security Council blocked by the Cold War 
confrontation, the UNGA emerged as the place for advancing legal and political 
struggles. In 1966 a debate started within the UNGA, with Hungary accusing the 
US of violating international law and the Geneva Protocol by using herbicides in 
Vietnam.44 The UNGA passed Resolution 2162 (XXI), calling for a ‘strict 
observance by all States of the principles and objectives of the Protocol’ and 
                                                 
 40 Michael Bothe, ‘The Protection of the Environment in Times of Armed Conflict: Legal 
Rules, Uncertainty, Deficiencies and Possible Developments’ (1991) 34 German Yearbook 
of International Law 54, 57; Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile 
Use of Environmental Modification Techniques, opened for signature 10 December 1976, 
1108 UNTS 151 (entered into force 5 October 1978) (‘ENMOD Convention’). A non-
exclusive list of ‘phenomena that could be caused by the use of environmental modifications 
techniques’ is included in the Understanding Relating to Article II of the ENMOD 
Convention and includes ‘earthquake, tsunamis; an upset in the ecological balance of a 
region; changes in weather patterns … changes in climate patters, changes in ocean currents; 
changes in the state of the ozone layer; changes in the state of the ionosphere’. See Report of 
the Conference on the Committee on Disarmament, Volume I, UN GAOR, 31st sess, Supp 
No 27, UN Doc A/31/27 (1976) 92. 
 41 Additional Protocol I arts 35(3), 55. 
 42 Violations of arts 35(3) and 55(1) of Additional Protocol I were not listed as grave breaches 
and the ENMOD Convention did not impose individual criminal liability for the violation of 
its provisions.  
 43 See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, opened for signature 17 July 1998, 
2187 UNTS 90 (entered into force 1 July 2002) art 8(2)(b)(iv) (‘Rome Statute’). For a 
discussion on the role of the International Criminal Court (‘ICC’) in relation to 
environmental degradation and the limitations of international criminal justice in the 
ecological field, see, eg, Eliana Cusato, ‘Beyond Symbolism: Problems and Prospects with 
Prosecuting Environmental Destruction Before the ICC’ (2017) 15 Journal of International 
Criminal Justice 491.  
 44 Question of General and Complete Disarmament, UN GAOR, 21st session, 1st Comm, 1451st 
mtg, UN Doc A/C.1/SR.1451 (11 November 1966) paras 27–37; Geneva Protocol. The 
Hungarian delegation also submitted a draft resolution proposing that the United Nations 
General Assembly, after recalling that the Geneva Protocol of 1925 had been recognised by 
many states, would declare that the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons for the 
purpose of destroying human beings and the means of their existence constituted and 
international crime. See Hungarian Draft Resolution Submitted to the First Committee of the 
General Assembly: Use of Chemical and Bacteriological Weapons, UN GAOR, 21st sess, 1st 
Comm, UN Doc A/C.1/L.374 (7 November 1966). 
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condemning ‘all actions contrary to those objectives’.45 Although the resolution 
did not address the scope of the Geneva Protocol with regard to specific 
weapons and used general language, it marked the first time that the US had to 
defend its military strategies in Vietnam before the international community.46 In 
1969 the UNGA went further and adopted Resolution 2603 to clarify the scope 
of the Geneva Protocol.47 It declared as 
contrary to the generally recognized rules of international law, as embodied in the 
Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or 
Other Gases and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 
June 1925, the use in international armed conflicts of: a) Any chemical agent of 
warfare — chemical substances, whether gaseous, liquid or solid — which might 
be employed because of their direct toxic effects on man, animals, or plants.48 
The significance of this paragraph is twofold. First, it recognises that the 
Geneva Protocol embodies ‘generally recognized rules of international law’, 
hence binding even those states that did not ratify the instrument (ie the US); 
second, it expressly includes within the scope of the Protocol ‘any chemical 
agent[s] of warfare’, notably those which might be employed for their toxic 
effects on plants.49 Both statements, however, were opposed by the American 
government, whose official position was that the rules of international law, 
including the Geneva Protocol, did not prohibit the military use of herbicides.50 
The silence of international institutions was broken by a group of 
philosophers, lawyers and activists that in 1966 created the Russell Tribunal. The 
founder of the tribunal was the English philosopher Bertrand Russell and Jean-
Paul Sartre was the executive president.51 The reference was the Nuremberg 
Tribunal, but, lacking any international support, the Russell Tribunal was 
obviously unable to enforce its decisions.52 Its declared purpose was to expose 
the truth about what was happening in Vietnam to ‘arouse the conscience of the 
world’.53 The indirect objective was to put pressure on the US to end the war, 
which was still ongoing.54 Because of the obstacles in finding a seat for the 
tribunal, the initial idea of establishing the criminal responsibility of the 
                                                 
 45 Question of General and Complete Disarmament, GA Res 2162 (XXI), UN GAOR, 21st 
sess, 1484th plen mtg, Supp No 16, UN Doc A/RES/2162(XXI) (5 December 1966) pt B.  
 46 Zierler, above n 21, 145.  
 47 Question of Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons, GA Res 2603(XXIV), UN 
GAOR, 24th sess, 1836th plen mtg, Supp No 30, UN Doc A/RES/2603(XXIV) (16 December 
1969) pt A (‘Resolution 2603’).  
 48 Ibid (emphasis added).  
 49 Ibid. 
 50 Falk, ‘Environmental Warfare’, above n 5, 86. It should be noted that, on 22 January 1975, 
the US President Gerald Ford signed the instrument of ratification of the 1925 Geneva 
Protocol. See Zierler, above n 21, 157. 
 51 John Duffett (ed), Against the Crime of Silence: Proceedings of the Russell International 
War Crimes Tribunal (Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation, 1968) 17. 
 52 ‘Jean Paul Sartre’s Inaugural Statement to the Tribunal’ in Duffett (ed), above n 51, 40, 42–
3: affirming, however, that the ‘Russell tribunal considers … that its legitimacy derives 
equally from its total powerlessness, and from its universality’: at 43. 
 53 ‘Aims and Objectives of the Tribunal’ in Duffett (ed), above n 51, 14, 15.  
 54 ‘Bertrand Russell’s Final Address to the Tribunal: Copenhagen, December 1967’ in Duffett 
(ed), above n 51, 654. 
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American President and other leaders was abandoned; rather, the Russell 
Tribunal focused on state responsibility for international crimes.55 
In 1967 the Russell Tribunal held multiple sessions in Stockholm, Sweden 
and Roskilde, Denmark. At the end of the first group of sessions, it found the US 
responsible for aggression against Vietnam, deliberate attacks against the civilian 
population and violation of Cambodian territorial sovereignty.56 The session in 
Denmark dealt with the charges for genocide and violations of the laws of war.57 
The issue of chemical warfare was addressed inter alia by Edgar Lederer, a 
French professor of biology.58 Lederer described the environmental devastation 
and human suffering caused by the herbicidal warfare in Vietnam and argued 
that Operation Ranch Hand captured the criminal dimension of the American 
war in South Vietnam.59 He concluded that ‘there can be no doubt that 
defoliation of the forests, the jungle and the bush are already having dangerous 
repercussions on the conditions of human environment’.60 In its second verdict, 
the Russell Tribunal found the US responsible for genocide against the 
Vietnamese people and for the use of prohibited weapons.61 The US and its allies 
refused to be involved with the work of the tribunal, whereas the government of 
North Vietnam praised its efforts, allowed witnesses to participate in its sessions 
and even funded the tribunal’s trips to Vietnam to collect evidence.62 
The Russell Tribunal can be regarded as an attempt to expose a different 
‘truth’ about the Vietnam conflict and to provide accountability for the American 
conduct of warfare, including for Operation Ranch Hand. It gave a voice to the 
Vietnamese victims of ‘environmental warfare’, whose suffering international 
law was unable to fully capture.63 Although in the short run the Russell Tribunal 
was not successful in bringing the conflict to an end, it received international 
attention and media coverage thanks to the reputation and standing of its 
members.64 As such it brought to the public attention what was happening in 
South-East Asia, because, to use Russell’s words, ‘silence is complicity, a lie, a 
crime’.65 Together with the movement against ecocide, the Russell Tribunal 
contributed to ‘arouse the conscience’ of antiwar activists in the West and, 
ultimately, to the termination of the military use of herbicides in 1971. 
                                                 
 55 Marcos Zunino, ‘Subversive Justice: The Russell Vietnam War Crimes Tribunal and 
Transitional Justice’ (2016) 10 International Journal of Transitional Justice 211, 213–14.  
 56 ‘Verdict of the Stockholm Session’ in Duffett (ed), above n 51, 302, 303–5.  
 57 Jean Paul Sartre, ‘Opening Address to the Second Session’ in Duffett (ed), above n 51, 315. 
 58 Edgar Lederer, ‘Report of the Sub-Committee on Chemical Warfare in Vietnam’ in Duffett 
(ed), above n 51, 338–66. 
 59 Zierler above n 21, 20.  
 60 ‘Report of the Sub-Committee on Chemical Warfare in Vietnam’ in Duffett (ed), above n 
51, 363. 
 61 Dave Dellinger, ‘Summary and Verdict of the Second Session’ in Duffett (ed), above n 51, 
650.  
 62 Zunino above n 55, 214.  
 63 For an insightful and inspiring discussion on people’s tribunals and their different 
conceptualisation of justice, see Dianne Otto, ‘Beyond Legal Justice: Some Personal 
Reflections on People’s Tribunals, Listening and Responsibility’ (2017) 5 London Review of 
International Law 225.  
 64 Zunino, above n 55, 228. 
 65 ‘Bertrand Russell’s Final Address to the Tribunal: Copenhagen, December 1967’ in Duffett 
(ed), above n 51. 653. 
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C Seeking Redress before American Domestic Courts 
More recently, some (unsuccessful) attempts were made by Vietnamese 
victims to seek justice before the American Courts. In 2004, relying on the 
ACTA, the Vietnam Association for Victims of Agent Orange/Dioxin started a 
civil lawsuit against the corporations that manufactured and sold Agent Orange 
and other herbicides to the US government during the Vietnam War.66 The 
ATCA, a statute passed in 1789, grants American district court’s jurisdiction over 
any civil action by an alien claiming damages for a tort committed ‘in violation 
of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States’.67 The American 
corporations were sued for violation of international law and war crimes, and for 
domestic tort law and strict product liability under US laws. Plaintiffs sought 
monetary and punitive damages for personal injuries, wrongful death and birth 
defects, as well as injunctive relief in the form of environmental clean-up of 
contaminated areas in Vietnam.68 
The district court, however, upheld the government-contractor defence 
invoked by the chemical corporations to dismiss the domestic law claims.69 As 
for international law, the court concluded that the military use of Agent Orange 
did not violate a ‘well-defined and universally-accepted international norm’.70 
Central in the district court’s reasoning is the argument that Agent Orange was 
used to protect United States troops against ambush and not as a weapon against 
human populations.71 In other words, the toxic effects of Agent Orange were 
collateral, unintended consequences, and as such, the military use of herbicides 
did not entail a violation of international law. 
Interestingly, years before, in 1979, the same district court in New York was 
called to decide on a lawsuit brought by a group of American war veterans who 
became ill from the effects of Agent Orange and other defoliants.72 In 1984, 
there was a settlement with the manufacturing companies that led to the payment 
of USD180 million, without any admission of liability.73 After this settlement, 
                                                 
 66 Nguyen Thang Loi v Dow Chemical Co (In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation), 
373 F Supp 2d 7 (ED NY, 2005) (‘Product Liability Litigation’). 
 67 ATCA.  
 68 Edwin A Martini, Agent Orange: History, Science, and the Politics of Uncertainty 
(University of Massachusetts Press, 2012) 222.  
 69 Takesh Uesugi, ‘Is Agent Orange a Poison? Vietnamese Agent Orange Litigation and the 
New Paradigm of Poison’ (2013) 24 The Japanese Journal of American Studies 203, 208.  
 70 See Vietnam Association for Victims of Agent Orange v Dow Chemical Company, 517 F 3d 
114 (Miner J) (2nd Cir, 2008) (‘Vietnam Association Case’). See generally Martini, above 
n 68, 223–4.  
 71 Product Liability Litigation, 373 F Supp 2d 7, 121 (Weinstein J) (ED NY, 2005). 
 72 The legal history of Agent Orange litigation involving war veterans is very complex. It 
started with In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation, 475 F Supp 928 (ED NY, 
1979). For a list of all subsequent decisions, see Dennis K Rhoades, Michael R Leaveck and 
James C Hudson (eds), The Legacy of Vietnam Veterans and Their Families: Survivors of 
War, Catalysts for Change (Agent Orange Class Assistance Program, 1995) 489–92 app G. 
 73 Many Vietnam War veterans reported dissatisfaction with the settlement, claiming that the 
money received was too little and that the settlement left many questions unanswered about 
the responsibility of the manufacturers. See Alexis Abboud, In re Agent Orange Product 
Liability Litigation (1979–1984) (3 July 2018) Embryo Project Encyclopedia 
<http://embryo.asu.edu/handle/10776/11471> archived at <https://perma.cc/67GS-RDLN>.  
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other individual lawsuits were brought by war veterans, but they were all 
dismissed because of lack of evidence of causation.74 
Even less successful were the efforts of obtaining compensation by the 
Vietnamese victims. On 22 February 2008, the Court of Appeals confirmed the 
decision of the lower court and found in a similar vein that 
[t]he sources of international law relied on by Plaintiffs do not support a 
universally-accepted norm prohibiting the wartime use of Agent Orange that is 
defined with the degree of specificity required by Sosa. Although the herbicide 
campaign may have been controversial, the record before us supports the 
conclusion that Agent Orange was used as a defoliant and not as a poison 
designed for or targeting human populations. Inasmuch as Agent Orange was 
intended for defoliation and for destruction of crops only, its use did not violate 
the international norms relied upon here, since those norms would not necessarily 
prohibit the deployment of materials that are only secondarily, and not 
intentionally, harmful to humans.75 
Like the district court, the Court of Appeal reaffirmed the distinction between 
the use of substances ‘intentionally’ harmful to humans (ie poisons) and those 
‘only secondarily’ harmful (ie defoliant).76 According to the Court, it was 
controversial within the international community whether the prohibition on the 
use of poisons, enshrined inter alia in art 23 of the 1907 Hague Regulations 
Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land (‘Hague Regulations’), 
would apply to defoliants that ‘had possible unintended toxic side effects’.77 
Other provisions in the laws of war relied on by the plaintiff (eg the norm of 
proportionality and the prohibition of unnecessary suffering) were found to be 
‘too indefinite’ to support the specificity requirement set out by the Supreme 
Court in the Sosa Case.78 In 2009 the Supreme Court declined to hear the case, 
putting an end to the Vietnamese victims’ civil lawsuit.79 
IV THE TURN TO ‘VOLUNTARY REMEDIATION’: THE US-FUNDED 
ENVIRONMENTAL AND HEALTH PROJECTS IN VIETNAM 
For decades the legacy of Agent Orange has been a major issue in the bilateral 
relations between the US and Vietnam. Things started to change only very 
recently. In 2000, when President Bill Clinton visited Vietnam, the two 
                                                 
 74 See Vietnamese Victims, above n 25, 30; Uesugi above n 69, 207–8.  
 75 Vietnam Association Case, 517 F 3d 104, 119–20 (Miner J) (2nd Cir, 2008) (emphasis 
added).  
 76 Ibid. 
 77 Ibid 120; Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, opened for 
signature 18 October 1907, 205 ConTS 227 (entered into force 26 January 1910) annex 
(‘Regulation Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land’) art 23. 
 78 Vietnam Association Case, 517 F 3d 104, 122 (Miner J) (2nd Cir, 2008). See Sosa v Alvarez-
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 79 It is worth noting that, in the recent case of Jesner v Arab Bank PLC, the US Supreme Court 
ruled that aliens cannot bring a suit under the ATCA against foreign corporations. See Jesner 
et al v Arab Bank PLC 138 S Ct 1386 (2018). Before that, in Kiobel v Royal Dutch 
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governments agreed on a joint scientific research project to assess the impact of 
herbicides in Vietnam, but the project fell apart.80 In 2006 President George W 
Bush and President Nguyen Minh Triet signed a joint statement, in which they 
pleaded that ‘[f]urther joint efforts to address the environmental contamination 
near former dioxin storage sites would make a valuable contribution to the 
continued development of bilateral relations’.81 Based on the renewed economic 
and political cooperation between the two governments, a Joint Advisory 
Committee was established and the US started to fund environmental 
remediation programmes in areas characterised as ‘hot spots’ for the high dioxin 
contamination.82 Since 2007, the US Congress has appropriated more than 
USD130 million to address the environmental and health consequences of the 
Agent Orange/dioxin contamination.83 The projects funded by the US Congress 
have been administered by the US State Department and the US Agency for 
International Development (‘USAID’), together with Vietnamese partners, such 
as ministries and governmental agencies.84 
These initiatives include the clean-up of the area surrounding Danang Airport, 
which was the main US military base during the Vietnam War and where huge 
stock piles of defoliants were stored. In 2009, the US State Department and the 
Vietnamese Ministry of Natural Resources and the Environment signed an 
agreement establishing the framework for the environmental remediation project 
in Danang.85 According to the project timeline, the remediation activity was 
completed at the end of 2017 and the treatment structure dismantled in early 
2018.86 The American and Vietnamese governments have recently agreed on a 
further environmental remediation project involving Bien Hoa airbase, which is 
considered another dioxin ‘hot spot’ due to the vast quantity of herbicides stored 
there during the war.87 Whilst some mitigation measures were implemented in 
the past by the Vietnamese government, the contaminated area is wide and 
requires further clean-up efforts.88 
In addition to environmental remediation, USAID has used the funds 
Congress appropriated to finance health and disability programmes in areas 
contaminated with dioxin as part of a broader programme to support persons 
with disabilities. Assisting Vietnamese with disabilities, regardless of the cause 
of their disability, is one of the oldest USAID programmes in Vietnam, active 
                                                 
 80 Martini, above n 68, 207.  
 81 Ibid 208.  
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 86 The environmental remediation project timeline is available online at US Agency for 
International Development, Environmental Remediation: Project Timeline (17 September 
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since 1989.89 Between 2007 and 2010, USAID worked with local governmental 
and non-governmental organisations to fund health and rehabilitation 
programmes in Danang.90 However, commentators observe that the majority of 
US funds have been directed at environmental clean-up, as the American 
government remains reluctant to support initiatives meant to address health 
conditions attributed to Agent Orange.91 
A question raised by the recent practice of the US concerns the legal nature of 
these initiatives under international law. Although the US’s official position is 
that the funding of environmental remediation and health programmes in 
Vietnam is a form of development aid (the fact that USAID oversees their 
implementation being a clear indication thereof), the question deserves further 
attention. In what follows, I reflect on whether these projects may be qualified as 
reparation, in its established meaning in international law before suggesting that 
the category of ex gratia payments may better capture American practice in 
Vietnam. This analysis paves the way for the subsequent critique of ‘voluntary 
remediation’, which will draw upon postcolonial legal theory. 
It is a well-established rule of international law that reparation must be made 
for breaches of international obligations.92 In the laws of armed conflict, art 91 
of Additional Protocol I provides that: ‘[a] party to the conflict which violates 
the provisions of the Conventions or of this Protocol shall, if the case demands, 
be liable to pay compensation. It shall be responsible for all acts committed by 
persons forming part of its armed forces’.93 Article 31 of the International Law 
Commission’s Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts codifies the rule in the following terms: ‘[t]he responsible State is 
under an obligation to make full reparation for the injury caused by the 
internationally wrongful act’.94 The duty to make reparation ensues from a 
breach of an international obligation binding upon the state. Conversely, in the 
absence of an international obligation or of a breach thereof, there is no 
reparation, strictly speaking. 
Attaching the label of reparation to environmental remediation and disability 
projects funded by the US is problematic. To begin with, reparations are 
distinguished from reconstruction and victim assistance first ‘by their roots as a 
                                                 
 89 For more details on the Persons with Disabilities Support Programme, see information 
available at United States Agency for International Development, Persons with Disabilities 
Support Program (2012–2015) (17 September 2018) 
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legal entitlement based on an obligation to repair harm, and second, by an 
element of recognition of wrongdoing, as well as harm, atonement or making 
good’.95 The position of the US government has always been that no rule of 
international law prohibited, at the time, the military use of chemical herbicides, 
nor proscribed the destruction of crops intended for use only by the enemy 
forces. Further, the US has repeatedly denied any scientific evidence of a direct 
causal link between the exposure to Agent Orange and diseases affecting the 
Vietnamese population.96 The US-funded environmental remediation 
programmes and assistance to Vietnamese people suffering from disabilities 
have been accompanied by the unequivocal denial of any legal liability for the 
use of Agent Orange or ‘wrongdoing’. As seen before, in the official narrative, 
the remediation projects have been framed as forms of development assistance to 
Vietnam. Interestingly, the US has been unwilling to provide direct assistance to 
purported victims of herbicides;97 the disability projects recalled above have 
been designed with a broad scope, not limited to Agent Orange victims but 
embracing the broader category of ‘vulnerable populations’.98 In a recent press 
release, the US government recognised that:  
Since 2000, the United States has worked with Vietnam to resolve humanitarian 
and wartime legacy issues. These include the removal of unexploded ordinance, 
the identification of remains of missing personnel, remediation of dioxin, and 
addressing health consequences of the war.99  
This statement seems to acknowledge a correlation between the war, the use 
of dioxin and health consequences for Vietnamese peoples. However, it does not 
change the position of the American government that there is no legal 
compulsion for its ongoing efforts to ‘resolve wartime legacy’. 
The attitude of the Vietnamese government vis-a-vis the legacy of dioxin 
contamination has also been ambivalent and shifted over time. In the past, the 
government expressed concern over the condition of Vietnamese peoples 
suffering from diseases correlated to the exposure to Agent Orange and 
requested the US to take responsibility, especially considering the different 
treatment of American veterans at home.100 In the last decades, however, 
political, security and economic considerations have taken priority over the 
legacy of Agent Orange. Since the bilateral relations between the two countries 
were re-established in the mid-1990s, the Vietnamese government has taken a 
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prudent stand to avoid the Agent Orange issue to affect the renewed cooperation 
with the powerful commercial partner.101 
The conduct and statements of both parties (the US and, more recently, 
Vietnam) indicate that ongoing initiatives to address wartime legacies cannot be 
framed as reparation. Even if one wanted to claim that the American 
government’s intention to ‘make good’ could be implied facta concludentia, the 
ways these programmes are implemented, and who their beneficiaries are, raise 
further questions. The issue of whether individuals have rights under the laws of 
armed conflict, including the right to reparation in case of violation, is highly 
debated in the literature.102 Historically, war reparations were settled through 
inter-state agreements, which included the payment of a lump sum and waiver of 
individual claims. As such, the beneficiary of the international obligation to 
provide reparation remained the injured state.103 Yet, in the last couple of 
decades, a different perspective has emerged. In a few cases, individual victims 
were granted the right to bring claims and ultimately awarded compensation for 
violations of the laws of armed conflict.104 In 2005, the UNGA Basic Principles 
and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy formally recognised that victims of 
serious violations of international humanitarian law, occurring both in 
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international and internal armed conflict, have the right to an ‘adequate, effective 
and prompt reparation for the harm suffered’.105 
Although the Vietnamese people living in dioxin contaminated areas may be 
the final beneficiaries of the US programmes, the sums are not directly handled 
over to individual victims, nor to the affected communities. The recipients of the 
funds appropriated by the US Congress and administered by USAID are local 
and international NGOs helping people with disabilities, and private contractors 
(mostly American corporations) implementing environmental remediation 
projects.106 Ultimately, given their features and scope, ongoing environmental 
and disabilities projects cannot be qualified as reparation. If not reparation, then 
what? 
The funding of environmental clean-up projects in Vietnam presents some 
similarity with the practice of ex gratia payments, often associated with episodes 
of transboundary environmental damage or incidents involving the shutting-
down of civilian or military airplanes.107 The offer to make ex gratia payments, 
with no acknowledgment and irrespective of any legal liability, is frequent in the 
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(Cambridge University Press, 3rd ed, 2012) 717–18, citing Emanuel Margolis, ‘The 
Hydrogen Bomb Experiments and International Law’ (1955) 64 Yale Law Journal 629, 
638–9: referring to USD2 million paid by the US to Japan in 1955 for ‘the purposes of 
compensation for the injuries or damage sustained’ by Japanese nationals as a consequence 
of the thermonuclear tests carried out near the Marshall Island. Further, following the crash 
of the satellite Cosmo 954 on Canadian territory, the Soviet Union and Canada agreed on an 
ex gratia payment of CAD3 million for damage related to locating, recovering, removing 
and testing radioactive debris and for cleaning up the affected area: at 718. See also the 
examples of ex gratia payments for shooting down airlines mentioned in Marian Nash 
Leich, ‘Denial of Liability: Ex Gratia Compensation on a Humanitarian Basis’ (1989) 83 
American Journal of International Law 319, 322–3.  
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international practice of states.108 In such instances, the voluntary payment of a 
sum by a state is commonly seen as a diplomatic gesture without any legal 
connotation. As noted in the literature, when states ‘act merely ex gratia, without 
acknowledging legal compulsion, then the act is not evidence of consent to a 
legal requirement to act in the way selected’.109 The notion of ex gratia payment 
seems to better fit the US’s approach vis-a-vis the legacy of Agent Orange in 
Vietnam, notwithstanding two minor differences. First, the US and the 
Vietnamese government have agreed to implement these projects on the basis of 
a bilateral agreement; in other words, the environmental remediation and 
disability programmes are not properly the result of a unilateral gesture by the 
US. Second, the US does not only provide the funding necessary, but through 
USAID, it is directly involved in the execution of the projects.110 
Given the peculiarities of the Vietnamese case, the term ‘voluntary 
remediation’ may be appropriate to describe current efforts to address the 
negative impacts of Agent Orange. The adjective ‘voluntary’ reflects the US’s 
constant denial of any liability and emphasis on the humanitarian, rather than 
legal motivation for assistance to the Vietnamese people and government 
through environmental restoration and disability programmes. The difference, 
however, with development assistance is that ‘voluntary remediation’, like ex 
gratia payments, is linked to a specific event (or accident), not to general 
development concerns. In both cases the state making the payment acts on 
humanitarian grounds, not based on legal compulsion, but the rationale is 
different. Qualifying the US’s projects as ‘voluntary remediation’ at least 
underscores the reasons why they are in place, ie the military use of chemical 
defoliants during the Vietnam War. 
The turn to ‘voluntary remediation’ as a possible response to the 
environmental impact of armed conflict may be appealing, given the legal, 
political and practical difficulties in establishing a breach of international 
obligation and enforcing the laws of war, as exemplified by the Vietnamese 
                                                 
 108 The US seems to be a supporter of the practice of compensating States for damage caused 
by warfare, without admission of fault. A notable example is the payment by the American 
government of USD28 million to China for the accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy 
in Belgrade during NATO intervention in 1999. See Payne, above n 8, 513 n 59, citing ‘US 
to Pay China for Bombing’, New York Times (New York), 16 December 1999. It is however 
apposite to acknowledge that ‘out of court’ dispute-settlement, or payment of compensation 
without admission of fault, is not unique to international law. This practice is also common 
at the domestic level and in relation to different types of claims, notably in cases involving 
human rights violations by corporate actors. For a discussion on the ethical and theoretical 
implications of settlement agreements in cases of corporate violations of human rights, see 
Justin Jos, ‘Access to Remedies and the Emerging Ethical Dilemmas: Changing Contours 
within the Business–Human Rights Debate’ (2018) 15 Revista de Direito Internacional 116.  
 109 Harold G Maier, ‘Ex Gratia Payments and the Iranian Airline Tragedy’ (1989) 83 American 
Journal of International Law 325, 325. Maier argues that the utility of ex gratia payment 
rests in the possibility of offering ‘de facto aid to the victims in circumstances where the 
actual facts cannot be found and interpreted or where, for other reasons, acknowledging 
legal liability might be politically unacceptable to the nation involved’: at 329.  
 110 For instance, the environmental remediation project around Danang airport has been 
followed by USAID through completion, as illustrated by the different reports published on 
its website. See United States Agency for International Development, Progress Highlights 
(1 October 2018) <https://www.usaid.gov/vietnam/progress-reports-environmental-
remediation-dioxin-contamination-danang-airport> archived at <https://perma.cc/M8D5-
RP4Z>.  
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case.111 Yet, it is also questionable for several reasons. One order of concern 
pertains to the weakening of the law’s capacity to influence the behaviour of 
relevant actors, thereby compromising the goals that the laws of armed conflict 
are purported to achieve, ie the regulation of the use of force and protection of 
the civilian population and objects. While it may be true that ‘formal 
enforcement remains, in international law as in domestic, of only partial 
significance in securing compliance with law’,112 pursuing remediation 
initiatives that have no formal legal grounding would undermine the law’s 
preventive and expressivist functions (ie social disapproval). Both functions are 
considered essential in the environmental field, as environmental harm is often 
irremediable and its injurious consequences may last years, if not decades.113 
That said, there is another way of approaching the turn to ‘voluntary 
remediation’ in the case of Vietnam and the implications it bears for 
contemporary armed conflict. Part V focuses on a subtler risk associated with the 
idea of ‘voluntary remediation’ and on some problematic assumptions implicit in 
‘soft’ responses (ie without legal compulsion) to the environmental 
consequences of conflicts. 
V UNDERSTANDING THE EXCLUSION OF THE ‘SAVAGE’ AND HER 
ENVIRONMENT FROM THE PROTECTION OF THE LAWS OF WAR 
Scholars have demonstrated that colonialism has been central to the formation 
of international law and that many of its fundamental doctrines, notably 
sovereignty, have been created through the colonial encounter.114 More 
essentially, this scholarship suggests that existing legal discourses and practices 
still contain traces of the colonial foundations of the discipline and reproduce 
patterns of exclusion, which are justified by the idea of the ‘other’ as savage or 
                                                 
 111 Payne, above n 8, 514: Payne claims that the ‘unilateral reparations practice’ of the US (eg 
in Kosovo) can be regarded as ‘an effort to do justice’, although she recognises that it could 
also be seen as ‘an exercise of power by other means’ and that ‘the United States likely does 
not consider it legally mandated’. Nonetheless, she contends that ‘in the field of 
environment, which is perhaps more focused on physical results than on moral and ethical 
concerns, the practical incentives to make the conquered land habitable and productive 
might predominate and make it easier for powerful states to conform their behaviour to the 
modes of justice’.  
 112 Deborah Pearlstein, ‘Armed Conflict at the Threshold?’ (Research Paper No 537, Cardozo 
Legal Studies, 26 February 2018) 17.  
 113 See, eg, Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v Slovakia) (Judgment) [1997] ICJ Rep 7, 
78: ‘[t]he Court is mindful that, in the field of environmental protection, vigilance and 
prevention are required on account of the often irreversible character of damage to the 
environment and of the limitations inherent in the very mechanism of reparation of this type 
of damage’.  
 114 See the fundamental work of Anghie cited above: see especially Anghie, Imperialism, 
Sovereignty and the Making of International Law, above n 6.  
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primitive.115 Arguably, a postcolonial look at the laws of armed conflict may 
help to explain American ‘environmental warfare’ in Vietnam and the legal 
arguments supporting the use of chemical herbicides during that conflict. 
Further, the civilised versus uncivilised divide, at the core of the postcolonial 
critiques of international law,116 may offer a different conceptual framework to 
explain American denial of responsibility for the use of Agent Orange and the 
turn to voluntary responses to dioxin contamination and human suffering in 
Vietnam. 
As illustrated by Frédéric Mégret, despite the humanitarian impulse of some 
scholars that argued for the universal character of the laws of war, the idea that 
they did not apply beyond the European world was well accepted until the early 
20th century.117 A notable example is given by the use of chemical weapons and 
poisonous gases during the war in Ethiopia by Italian troops. Interestingly, the 
use of chemical weapons against Ethiopians led some commentators to expect 
their employment during World War II. Yet it soon became clear that: 
war among the industrialized nations of Europe was a different matter than 
conflicts involving less technologically advanced areas, such as the colonies. The 
surprising lack of gas warfare during World War II can thus be understood as 
implicated in a process by which the conduct of war among ‘civilized’ nations 
was demarcated from that involving ‘uncivilized’ nations … [Chemical weapons] 
                                                 
 115 In relation to the human rights discourse, see, eg, Makau Mutua, ‘Savages, Victims, and 
Saviors: The Metaphors of Human Rights’ (2001) 42 Harvard International Law Journal 
201; Ratna Kapur, ‘Human Rights in the 21st Century: Take a Walk on the Dark Side’ 
(2006) 28 Sydney Law Review 665. For a TWAIL critique of the field of international 
environmental law, see, eg, Usha Natarajan and Kishan Khoday, ‘Locating Nature: Making 
and Unmaking International Law’ (2014) 27 Leiden Journal of International Law 573; Julia 
Dehm, ‘Carbon Colonialism or Climate Justice? Interrogating the International Climate 
Regime from a TWAIL Perspective’ (2016) 33(3) Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice 
129. For a postcolonial analysis of international criminal law, see, eg, John Reynolds and 
Sujith Xavier, ‘The Dark Corners of the World: TWAIL and International Criminal Justice’ 
(2016) 14 Journal of International Criminal Justice 959. On the impact of international 
institutions on peoples in Third World countries and a critique thereof, see B S Chimni, 
‘International Institutions Today: An Imperial Global State in the Making’ (2004) 15 
European Journal of International Law 1. For a critical approach to international law and 
development, see, eg, Sundhya Pahuja, Decolonising International Law: Development, 
Economic Growth and the Politics of Universality (Cambridge University Press, 2011). And 
to international investment law, see M S Sornarajah, The International Law on Foreign 
Investment (Cambridge University Press, 1994). 
 116 For a historical analysis of the concept of ‘civilisation’ in international law, see, eg, Liliana 
Obregón Tarazona, ‘The Civilized and the Uncivilized’ in Bardo Fassbender and Anne 
Peters (eds), The Oxford Handbook of the History of International Law (Oxford University 
Press, 2012) 917. Anghie uses the term ‘dynamic of difference’ to indicate the ‘endless 
process of creating a gap between two cultures’: see Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty, and 
the Making of International Law, above n 6, 4. See also Martti Koskenniemi, The Gentle 
Civilizer of Nations: Rise and Fall of International Law 1870–1960 (Cambridge University 
Press, 2002).  
 117 Mégret, ‘From “Savages” to “Unlawful Combatants”’, above n 7, 275. The 1914 British 
military manual, co-authored by Oppenheim, made it clear that ‘the rules of international 
law apply only to warfare between civilized nations … they do not apply in wars with 
uncivilized States and tribes’: at 279, quoting J E Edmonds and L Oppenheim, Land 
Warfare: An Exposition of the Laws and Usages of War on Land, for the Guidance of 
Officers of His Majesty’s Army (His Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1912) 14 [7].  
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were implicated in the process of the hierarchical ordering of international politics 
into the civilized and uncivilized arenas.118 
In other words, means and methods of warfare that were formally or 
practically outlawed in Europe, were used across the non-European world, and 
new weapons were tested in these ‘far away and isolated countries’.119 The 
underlying assumption was that war against savage or inferior populations had to 
be more brutal, because those savages ‘were incapable of showing restraint in 
warfare’.120 Similar dynamics seem to underpin the massive use of chemical 
defoliants and other environmentally harmful techniques in Vietnam, which 
would not have been acceptable in a war opposing Western States, particularly in 
the 1960s. To be fair, according to one commentator, the US was neither the first 
country nor the last to use herbicides in war and was inspired by the British, who 
used these substances in the 1950s to destroy forests and crops during the 
Malaya insurgency.121 Likewise, Israel used herbicides in 1972 for crop 
destruction in Jordan on at least one occasion; Portugal used herbicides against 
insurgents in Angola during the 1970s; and the US used chemical defoliants in 
its ‘war on drugs’ in Central America during the 1980s and afterwards.122 It is 
nonetheless telling that all these military conflicts or operations took place in 
distant, Third World countries. 
In addition to the geographical and cultural distance, as observed by Falk, 
‘environmental warfare’ in Vietnam cannot be understood without referring to 
the counterinsurgency doctrine, ‘which seek[s] to dry up the sea of civilians in 
which the insurgent fish attempt to swim. This drying up process is translated 
militarily into making the countryside unfit for civilian habitation’.123 The 
systemic destruction of the environment in Vietnam was aimed at denying to the 
enemy food, cover and support from the population. Such rationale was clearly 
recognised by the US military: 
 
There have been three choices open to the peasantry. One, to stay where they are; 
two, to move into the areas controlled by us; three, to move off into the interior 
towards the Vietcong. The application of our air power since February (1965) has 
made the first choice impossible from now on. It is not possible to stay in the line 
of fire and live. Our operations [eg Operation Ranch Hand] have been designed to 
make the first choice impossible, the second attractive, and to reduce the 
likelihood of anyone choosing the third to zero.124 
A vision transpires from this statement, and from the entire logic behind the 
counterinsurgency doctrine, of the enemy and of Vietnamese peasants as 
                                                 
 118 Richard Price, ‘A Genealogy of the Chemical Weapons Taboo’ (1995) 49 International 
Organization 73, 96–7.  
 119 Giorgio Rochat, ‘L’impiego dei gas nella Guerra d’Etiopia 1935–1936’ (1988) 1 Rivista di 
Storia Contemporanea 74, 103.  
 120 Mégret, ‘From “Savages” to “Unlawful Combatants”’, above n 7, 289 (emphasis altered) 
(citation omitted).  
 121 Frey, above n 18, 4.  
 122 Ibid.  
 123 See Falk, above n 5, 80.  
 124 US military spokesman quoted in Robert Guillain, Vietnam: The Dirty War (A Carter trans, 
Housman’s, 1966), cited in Malvern Lumsden, ‘“Conventional” War and Human Ecology’ 
(1975) 4 Ambio 223, 226.  
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‘uncivilised’ or ‘savage’, which justified the use of hazardous weapons and 
tactics, the deleterious long-term impact of which was still unknown.125 The 
massive spraying of herbicides in Vietnam was done, in effect, without regard to 
dioxin’s possible effect on human beings or its virulent afterlife. 
A further step needs to be taken to illustrate how legal arguments were 
developed and employed to deny the protection of the laws of war in relation to 
the means and methods of warfare described above (highly explosive bombs, 
Rome Plows, and chemical herbicides). After World War II, the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions came into force to impose further restrictions on the conduct of 
hostilities.126 Indiscriminate attacks against the Vietnamese environment would 
be, in principle, questionable under the tenets of jus in bello, notably distinction, 
proportionality and humanity (or prohibition of unnecessary suffering). 
Nevertheless, counterarguments were soon crafted by the US and its allies to 
exclude from the protection of international law peoples and ecosystems. 
According to the General Counsel to the US Department of Defense: 
Neither The Hague Regulations nor the rules of customary international law 
applicable to the conduct of war prohibit the use of anti-plant chemicals for 
defoliation or the destruction of crops, provided that their use against crops does 
not cause such crops as food to be poisoned by direct contact, and such use must 
not cause unnecessary destruction of enemy property. The Geneva Protocol of 
1925 adds no prohibitions relating either to the use of chemical herbicides or to 
crop destruction to those above. Bearing in view that neither the legislative 
history nor the practice of States draw chemical herbicides within its prohibitions, 
any attempt by the United States to include such agents within the Protocol would 
be the result of its own policy determination, amounting to a self-denial of the use 
of weapons. Such a determination is not compelled by the 1907 Hague 
Regulations, the Geneva Protocol of 1925, or the rules of customary international 
law.127 
Similarly, as observed above, legal positivism arguments, grounded on the 
principle of legal certainty, were used by the US during the UNGA debates in the 
1960s to dismiss the relevance of the Geneva Protocol and, later, by American 
courts in the context of the ATCA litigation to reject victims’ claims for 
compensation. To dismiss the relevance of the Hague Convention IV as a basis 
for a common law cause of action against the defendants, the District Court 
relied on ‘the imprecise scope of the Hague Convention IV’s prohibition on the 
use of “poison or poisoned weapons”, and the uncertainty as to whether that 
                                                 
 125 For a discussion on the scientific uncertainty surrounding the toxicity of chemical herbicides 
in 1960s–1970s and lack of appropriate studies on their latent health effects, see Uesugi 
above n 69, 213–14.  
 126 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in 
Armed Forces in the Field, opened for signature 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 31 (entered into 
force 21 October 1950) (‘Geneva Convention I’); Geneva Convention for the Amelioration 
of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at 
Sea, opened for signature 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 85 (entered into force 21 October 
1950) (‘Geneva Convention II’); Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners 
of War, opened for signature 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 135 (entered into force 21 October 
1950) (‘Geneva Convention III’); Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian 
Persons in Time of War, opened for signature 12 August 1949, 75 UNTS 135 (entered into 
force 21 October 1950) (‘Geneva Convention IV’). 
 127 Letter from J Fred Buzhardt, General Counsel to the Department of Defense to Senator J 
William Fulbright, 5 April 1971, quoted in Falk, ‘Environmental Warfare’, above n 5, 86.  
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prohibition even applies to lethal chemical weapons designed to kill human 
beings’.128 Notable also is the contention of the US Court of Appeals that the 
deployment of Agent Orange did not violate international law, because ‘the 
deployment of materials that are only secondarily, and not intentionally, harmful 
to humans’ was not clearly proscribed at the time of the Vietnam War.129 
Notwithstanding the recognition by the UNGA that chemical herbicides ‘which 
might be employed because of their toxic effects on (…) plants’130 would fall 
within the scope of the Geneva Protocol, the Court found that the definition of 
‘poison’ remained unsettled with respect to chemical agents not used as a 
weapon of war (ie intentionally against humans).131  
One must bear in mind that, in the traditional doctrine of sources, UNGA 
resolutions are not legally binding and that other efforts pursued by Third World 
states through the UNGA have been constantly resisted by powerful states.132 
Although UNGA resolutions may provide some evidence of customary 
international law, UNGA Resolution 2603 was not unanimous, with major 
military powers and other states either opposing it or abstaining.133 The absence 
of universal acceptance for the prohibition, and significantly the persistent 
objection by the US, were, in other words, essential to reach the conclusion that 
the conduct of the American government was not in clear violation of 
international law (at least at that time). As for the argument, upheld by the 
American courts, that defoliants were used to destroy crops intended only for 
consumption by armed forces, and as such they complied with international legal 
standards in force at the time, other evidence showed that, on the contrary, those 
who suffered the most from such tactics were civilians.134 
Present-day projects to clean-up the environment and assist persons with 
disability in Vietnam can also be read from a postcolonial perspective. Mégret 
has forcefully argued that, historically, the application of the laws of war to 
‘savages’ or non-European people has been discretionary, as a result of charity or 
chivalry rather than legal compulsion.135 Even after the adoption of the Hague 
                                                 
 128 Product Liability Litigation, 373 F Supp 2d 7, 117 (Weinstein J) (ED NY, 2005). 
 129 Vietnam Association Case, 517 F 3d 104 (2nd Cir, 2008).  
 130 Question of Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons, GA Res 2603(XXIV), UN 
GAOR, 24th sess, 1836th plen mtg, Supp No 30, UN Doc A/RES/2603(XXIV) (16 December 
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 131 Vietnam Association Case, 517 F 3d 104, 119–23 (Miner J) (2nd Cir, 2008).  
 132 Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty, and the Making of International Law, above n 6, 236–7.  
 133 The resolution was opposed by Australia and Portugal, while 36 other states abstained. See 
Zierler, above n 21, 146. 
 134 The effects of crop destruction were described by a former high official in the so-called 
pacification program in Vietnam in the following terms:  
In the course of investigations of the program in Saigon and in the provinces of 
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  See L Craig Johnstone, ‘Ecocide and the Geneva Protocol’ (1971) 49 Foreign Affairs 711, 
719, quoted in Falk, ‘Environmental Warfare’, above n 5, 87.  
 135 Mégret, ‘From “Savages” to “Unlawful Combatants”’, above n 7, 281–3.  
2018] From Ecocide to Voluntary Remediation 25 
 
Regulations, positive law was considered as not applicable to warfare with non-
European nations. Rather, it was ‘natural law’ that regulated the relations with 
‘barbarians’, through reference to European ideals such as honour and 
decency.136 To put it differently, European states were not bound by hard-law 
obligations vis-a-vis uncivilised peoples, but nonetheless they could choose to 
behave in a ‘good way’ on the basis of voluntary commitments. A similar 
rhetoric continues to underpin current responses to the pervasive legacy of 
‘environmental warfare’ in Vietnam. As discussed earlier, past and ongoing 
efforts to restore the environment in Vietnam have been consistently justified on 
humanitarian grounds, with the unequivocal denial of any legal responsibility or 
compulsion on the part of the US. The way in which dioxin-removal and 
disabilities projects are designed and implemented through USAID confirms that 
these are not forms of reparation for past wrongs, but they would fall within the 
category of ex gratia payments. 
This narrative of the non-applicability of the laws of war to the use of Agent 
Orange has become so established (also thanks to the jurisprudence of American 
courts in the ATCA litigation case) that even the Vietnamese government has 
abandoned the old language of ‘responsibility’ and welcomed the renewed 
‘cooperation’ with the US government. The times of the Russell Tribunal are far 
away, the term ecocide is forgotten and the two governments express satisfaction 
for the successful implementation of very expensive clean-up projects around 
Danang military base and plan further remediation initiatives. Perhaps this is the 
best result that the Vietnamese people and government could have expected to 
achieve, given the complex historical, geopolitical and legal factors at play. A 
pragmatic approach would indeed recognise that, after decades of inaction, the 
projects funded by the US Congress represent a first step towards addressing the 
ongoing impact of Agent Orange and, particularly, dioxin contamination in the 
most polluted sites. 
Yet there is a different way to look at the Vietnamese case that I sought to 
suggest; that is, as a story of exclusion from the protection of the law, which 
tends to repeat itself. As critical scholars have demonstrated, the dormant logic 
of colonialism periodically re-emerges in legal debates and doctrines.137 
Likewise, the old distinction between legal obligations vis-a-vis other ‘civilised’ 
states and voluntary/discretional application of the laws of war to ‘savages’ is 
illustrated by the nature of current efforts to address the consequences of 
‘environmental warfare’ in Vietnam. Looking at these issues through a 
                                                 
 136 Ibid 283, citing Friedrich de Martens, ‘La Russie et l’Angleterre dans l’Asie Centrale’ 
(1879) 11 Revue de droit international et de législation comparée 227, 241: de Martens 
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postcolonial lens provides key analytical tools to understand the failure of justice 
for the Vietnamese people and the enduring denial of recognition of rights and 
responsibility.138 At a more general level, reflecting on the problematic 
dimensions of ‘voluntary remediation’ in Vietnam helps shed light on some 
unintended consequences of well-meaning arguments or legal proposals to 
redress the environmental impact of contemporary armed conflict. While the idea 
of remedial measures implemented unilaterally or through multilateral 
cooperation may look appealing on an abstract level and offer practical solutions 
to the environmental challenges faced by countries emerging from violent 
conflict, it also has a less visible dark-side, which must be exposed. 
Ultimately, the arguments above have implications for present-day military 
conflicts, which are primarily fought in the Global South. One might think of the 
armed conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria and Yemen, where cluster bombs and 
depleted uranium weapons have been widely used, often in association with the 
idea of ‘smart wars’. Yet those ‘technologies, when they compromise the 
environment, morph into long-term killers, creating landscapes that inflict 
lingering, off-camera casualties’.139 Depleted uranium and other toxic remnants 
of war can seep into the soil and groundwater and enter the food chain, posing 
threats that span across time and space. The increasing use of armed drones 
raises similar concerns, given that airstrikes from drones typically use explosive 
weapons which may generate toxic remnants and of which the long-term 
environmental and human effects are still unknown;140 as were, in the 1960s, the 
effects of dioxin. The limited attention that the environmental costs of ‘smart 
wars’ has attracted so far in mainstream legal debates and practices raises the 
question of who counts as a war casualty. This question has a clear postcolonial 
dimension. As Rob Nixon compellingly argues,  
 
like most forms of pollution, cluster bombs and landmine pollution [are] only 
semirandom. Just as in Western nations toxic waste sites tend to be placed near 
poor or minority communities, so too unexploded ordnance pollution is 
concentrated in the world’s most impoverished societies …141 
VI CONCLUSION: VIETNAM AND BEYOND 
The Vietnam War, with its disastrous ecological and human impact, and the 
quest for justice of the Vietnamese victims are worth revisiting, as they offer the 
opportunity to reflect on the limitations of existing avenues of legal redress. A 
review of academic debates and judicial and non-judicial initiatives to establish 
accountability for ‘environmental warfare’ suggests that international law 
                                                 
 138 For a postcolonial critique of the continued disapplication of legal norms and remedies in 
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remains a powerful language, which may be used to ‘frame problems, suggest 
fault and responsibility, [and] propose solutions and remedies’.142 In 2004, the 
Honorary President of the Vietnamese Association of Victims of Agent Orange 
said that 
[n]o excuse can justify that those who set on the planes and spread toxics have 
been considered as catching or contracting disease, while those who had been 
spread toxics on their heads or had to the use the food and water mixed with 
toxics have not been recognized. This is an extremely severe violation of human 
rights … The aspirations and requests of Vietnam are extremely legitimate, being 
in accordance with ethics and international laws.143 
Yet the opposite is also true.144 This article shows how legal arguments 
grounded in the laws of war have been used to exclude the Vietnamese people 
and their environment from the protection of international rules. Borrowing from 
the postcolonial critique of international law, I claim that a similar exclusionary 
dynamic is entrenched in ongoing efforts to address the legacy of Agent Orange 
in Vietnam. Environmental restoration and health projects funded by the US and 
implemented on the basis of a bilateral agreement with the Vietnamese 
government are not forms of reparation under international law. They do not 
imply any recognition of wrongdoing or legal responsibility and cannot be 
regarded as efforts to do justice. Rather, they are justified by generic 
humanitarian and development concerns, and present some similarities with the 
category of ex gratia payments, as discussed above. The idea of ‘voluntary 
remediation’ (ie reparation without legal compulsion), translated from the 
Vietnamese case to instances of environmental degradation associated with 
present-day conflicts, raises difficult questions of what compliance, prevention 
and redress mean in situations of asymmetric warfare. Moving the abstract idea 
to the practical reality of military conflicts fought in Third World countries and 
keeping in mind the critical insights of postcolonial scholars help illuminate 
problematic assumptions implicit in well-meaning legal proposals aimed at 
reinforcing the protection of the environment in war-torn countries. This is 
arguably the first step in rethinking what justice for conflict-related ecological 
harms means and imagining a different international law that ‘fulfils its promise 
of advancing the cause of justice’.145 
                                                 
 142 See Anghie and Chimni, above n 6, 101. Koskenniemi also argues that international law can 
‘give voice to those who have been excluded from decision-making positions and are 
regularly treated as the objects of other peoples’ policies; it provides a platform on which 
claims about violence, injustice, and social deprivation may be made even against the 
dominant elements’. See Martti Koskenniemi, The Politics of International Law (Hart 
Publishing, 2011) 265–6.  
 143 Quote from the speech delivered by Mrs Nguyen Thi Binh at the Conference in Support of 
Vietnamese Victims of Agent Orange, held on 25 July 2004 in Ho Chi Minh City. Reference 
to the speech is taken from a picture at the War Remnants Museum in Ho Chi Minh City, 
visited by the author in February 2016.  
144 On the duality of international law and how ‘it is both regulatory and emancipatory, both 
imperial and anti-imperial’, see Sundhya Pahuja, ‘Decolonization and the Eventness of 
International Law’ in Johns, Joyce, and Pahuja, above n 138, 92. 
145 Anghie, ‘Finding the Peripheries’, above n 6, 33. 
